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Abstract: This paper simulates a macroprudential policy of reduction in capital 
requirements, in line with the measures promoted by macroprudential authorities to face 
the effects of the recent pandemic crisis on real economy. We do that in an otherwise 
standard DSGE model augmented with a housing sector and a macroprudential regulator. 
Results show that a regulatory intervention aiming at reducing capital requirements 
entails a deep and prolonged recession, worsening financial and macroeconomic stability. 
Overall, it follows that the effects could be opposite to those desired. Two channels lead 
to this outcome: the financial channel of interest rates on deposits and loans, and the real 
estate channel of housing prices. 
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"Unlike in the 2008 financial crisis, banks are not the source of the problem this time. But we need to 
ensure that they can be part of the solution" 
Andrea Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board (27 March 2020) 
 
1 Introduction 
The new Coronavirus hit the economic system provoking an undefined 
shock for its impact on public health and global economy. The main eco-
nomic consequences can be summarized as "stock-market crashes, surging 
financial volatility, decreases in nominal interest rates, and contractions of 
real economic activity" (Barro et al., 2020). Over the first phase of the pan-
demic, when the whole world was in quarantine, many companies faced 
default (insolvency) risks, fall in foreign and domestic demand, and diffi-
culty of provision of inputs. Restrictions imposed on transport among 
countries had slowed global economic activities down. The panic spread 
out among consumers and firms. Resulting needs in liquidity caused a 
solvency crisis that affected manufacturing system, making, therefore, the 
recession sharper and longer. 
In this difficult and uncertain context, policy makers actions aimed to 
mitigate the impact of the pandemics on real economy through extraordi-
nary monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies. In particular, macro-
prudential policies, introduced in the aftermath of the 2007 global financial 
crisis to cope with the emergence of possible systemic risks in the financial 
system, have been implemented to support banks to lend more to the 
borrowers harmed by the current pandemic. The Basel Committee's 
Oversight body, the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Su-
pervision (GHOS), adopted prudential actions to contrast the negative ef-
fects of the pandemic outbreak on real economy and banking system. In 
particular, the postponement of the new Basel III Reform (Basel IV 
Framework) to January 1st, 2023 and the temporary reduction in Basel III 
capital requirements (Bank for International Settlements, 2020; Levrick et 
al., 2020) have been put into effect. As well, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) announced a set of temporary measures to ensure that supervised 
banks are able to finance real economy in a situation like the very recent 
financial distress (ECB, April 2020). Importantly, "the ECB reminds banks 
under its supervision that, in these difficult times, all capital buffers may be 
used to withstand potential stress, in line with the initial intentions of the 
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international standard setter on the usability of the buffers" (ECB, press 
release of 12 March 2020). Capital buffers are defined as follows1: 
 
• Capital Conservation Buffer (CCoB, henceforth). It is "a capital 
buffer of up to 2.5% of a bank's total exposures to avoid breaches of min-
imum capital requirements during periods of stress when losses are in-
curred". 
 
• Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB, henceforth). It is "a capital 
buffer intended to ensure that credit institutions accumulate sufficient 
capital during periods of excessive credit growth to be able to absorb losses 
during periods of stress and it amounts to 0-2.5% of total risk exposure 
amount". 
 
• Systemic Risk Buffer (SRB). It is "a capital buffer applied to the fi-
nancial sector, in order to prevent and mitigate long-term non-cyclical 
systemic or macroprudential risks". 
 
These buffers were introduced by Basel III regulations, proposed in 2010 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), in addition to the 
minimum total capital of 8% required by Basel II (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2010). The combination between the CCoB and the 
required minimum total capital of 8% denotes the Capital Requirement 
Ratio (CRR, hereafter). 
In light of the above mentioned macroprudential announcements, ana-
lyzing the effects of concessions released by the ECB over the first lock-
down period in Europe (March 2020) turns out to be quite important from 
the policy maker's perspective, since authorities should be aware of the 
actual consequences of their announcements. This is what we do in this 
paper. We simulate a transition experiment of permanent reduction in the 
CCyB associated with a reduction in the CRR in a Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with housing sector à la Iacoviello 
(2015) and macroprudential policies (Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2016). 
The paper addresses two questions: what are the long- and short-run 
macroeconomic effects of a reduction in capital requirements? how costly 
is a reduction in capital requirements in terms of welfare? The answer to 
the first question is that the slackening of macroprudential policies, like the 
one implemented over the COVID-19 pandemic, may result detrimental to 
the real economy in the long run since it produces a deep recession. 
                                                 
1 Capital buffers' definitions are available on the ECB website. For further details: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glossc.en.html#7
74; last access September 28, 2021. 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS Vol. 12, Issue 1, Spring 2021, Article 2 
 
2021 University of Perugia Electronic Press. 
 
4 
Indeed, the increase in savers' consumption is not sufficient to compensate 
for the reduction in dividends and borrowers' consumption, and the net 
effect is a decrease in the aggregate demand. On the other hand, in the 
short run, output expands only for one quarter, thanks to the initial 
stimulus to the borrowers' consumption that compensate for the drop both 
in savers' consumption and dividends. The answer to the second question 
is that reducing capital requirements is welfare improving, at least for 
borrowers and savers. For banks, instead, the policy is welfare costly. In-
deed, their capital decreases, and thus, they have to cope with higher costs, 
facing lower earnings. In other words, the release in capital buffers pushes 
down dividends (that is banks' consumption). This, in turn, mainly 
influences the aggregate demand dynamics. Therefore, reducing capital 
requirements entails a financial crisis that translates into recession, con-
sistently with the empirically observed procyclicality of the financial sys-
tem. Specifically, in our model, the spread of the recession on the real 
economy takes place through both the financial channel of interest rates on 
deposits and loans, and the real estate channel of the housing prices. In 
conclusion, our simulations warn us that lower capital buffers could pro-
duce real effects opposite to those desired. 
Moreover, we investigate the role of monetary policy to eventually 
mitigate the recessive effects of more relaxed macroprudential policies. 
Our analysis is akin to those of the strand of literature concerning the in-
teraction between monetary and macroprudential policy, and the cumula-
tive, neutral, or conflicting impacts on price stability. In this regard, some 
authors seek the optimal combination of the policy parameters that max-
imizes welfare (Monacelli, 2008; Angelini et al., 2011; Kannan et al., 2012; 
De Paoli and Paustian, 2013; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2015, 2016). 
However, our focus is quite different because we are mainly interested in 
studying whether alternative monetary policy rules could help the econ-
omy to soften the recession generated by the partial use of bank capital 
buffers. To do that, starting from our reference paper by Rubio and Car-
rasco-Gallego (2016), who find the optimal implementation of Basel III and 
its interaction with monetary policy, we design different policy experi-
ments in order to assess the effects of monetary policy and macropruden-
tial policy, and their interdependencies (in line with Sinclair and Sun, 2014; 
Beau et al., 2012; Christensen and Meh, 2011; and Bailliu et al., 2015). 
Specifically, we perform a batch of robustness checks taking into account 
three different monetary policy rules: the first responds to inflation and 
output gap without interest rate smoothing; the second responds to infla-
tion, output gap, and credit growth (Alpanda and Zubairy, 2017), and the 
last responds to inflation, output gap, and housing prices growth (Rubio 
and Carrasco-Gallego, 2015). The last two countercyclical monetary rules 
include the response to financial variables as a macroprudential tool, con-
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straining the financial accelerator related to borrowers and, therefore, 
credit. Even employing different monetary policy rules, our results quali-
tatively hold. This allows us to confirm that releasing capital requirements 
worsens financial stability, regardless of monetary policy. Indeed, long-run 
recessionary effects persist but, at the same time, short-run positive effects 
worsen compared to those of our baseline model, in which the output 
reaches a higher expansionary peak in the short run. 
This paper contributes to the flourishing literature on bank capital reg-
ulations interested in analyzing macroprudential policies. Angelini et al. 
(2014a) and Gozzi et al. (2020) suggest that higher capital requirements can 
help in achieving a more stable economy. Instead, the only use of monetary 
policy to enhance financial stability can generate costs in terms of increased 
inflation variability. Sato (2020) considers the credit-to-GDP ratio as the 
macroprudential tool to implement countercyclical capital requirements. 
He finds that the dynamics of the aggregate supply of funds is more 
softened when banks can use more capital buffers against fluctuations in 
earnings on loans. On the contrary, Lozej et al. (2018) investigate the 
performance of several countercyclical capital buffer rules based on credit 
gap and real house prices. They demonstrate that these rules fail to 
attenuate the response of the economy to shocks that cause an acyclical 
credit gap response. Moreover, they show that these macroprudential rules 
amplify their negative effects when shocks trigger a countercyclical credit 
gap response. Baron (2020) argues that "higher capital requirements may 
reduce banks' risk-taking incentives and help banks better withstand 
adverse shocks". Pariès et al. (2011) show that an immediate implementa-
tion of higher capital requirements causes a drop in real GDP, but these 
negative effects are rapidly reabsorbed in the medium-long run. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model setup, and section 3 shows the calibration. Results are reported in 
section 4, in which we explain long- and short-run effects of the reduction 
in capital requirements. Then, we present the welfare effects. Robustness 
checks on monetary policy are shown in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Methods and Data 
We develop a DSGE model with housing market and macroprudential 
policy à la Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016). The economy is populated 
by households, banks, firms, and two authorities, the central bank and the 
macroprudential regulator. 
Households work and consume both consumption goods and housing. 
They are differentiated in savers and borrowers. The former, who are pa-
tient agents, deposit their savings in banks. Instead, borrowers are impa-
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6 
tient and borrow from banks. Therefore, banks intermediate funds among 
households. Specifically, financial intermediaries are credit constrained in 
borrowing from savers. Instead, impatient agents are credit constrained in 
borrowing from banks. The representative firm converts household labor 
into the final good. Central bank follows a Taylor rule in setting interest 
rate, and macroprudential authority follows a Taylor-type rule in setting 
capital requirement ratio. 
2.1 Savers 
The representative patient household chooses consumption �CS,t� , 
housing shares (HS,t), and working hours (NS,t). In particular, savers’ utility 
function is increasing in consumption and housing share, while it is 
decreasing in working hours: 








 � ,  
where βS∈(0,1) is the patient discount factor. 
1
η-1
 is the labor supply 
elasticity, where η>0. j>0 is the relative weight of housing in the utility 
function. 








where dt are bank deposits, RS,t is the gross return from deposits, qt is 
the housing price in units of consumption, and wS,t is the real wage rate. 
Xt is the markup of the firm, Yt is the output, and 
Xt-1
Xt
Yt represents firms' 
























where the first equation is the intertemporal condition for consumption 
(Euler equation), the second is the intertemporal condition for housing, 
and the last equation is the labor-supply condition. 
Busatto, Ferrara, Galano, Varlese: Effects of Releasing Capital Requirements: A DSGE Approach 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/329 7 
2.2 Borrowers 
The representative impatient household chooses consumption �CS,t�, 
housing shares (HS,t), and working hours (NS,t). Borrowers' utility function 
is increasing in consumption and housing share, while it is decreasing in 
working hours: 








 � , 
where βB∈(0,1) is the impatient discount factor.  







and the collateral constraint is: 





HB,tπt+1� , (6) 
where bt denotes bank loans, RB,t is the gross interest rate, and κ is the 
loan-to-value ratio. This borrowing constraint states that borrowing is lim-
ited to the present discounted value of their housing holdings. First order 






























where λB,t is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. These equations 
stay for the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for housing, and 
the labor-supply condition, respectively. 
2.3 Banks 
Banks maximize dividends (divf,t), that are fully consumed by bankers, 
so that Cf,t=divf,t. In particular, their utility is a convex function of divi-
dends, that can be thought as the residual income of banks after savers 
have been repaid and loans have been issued (Iacoviello, 2015). Their 
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where βf∈(0,1) is the bankers discount factor. 











 represents deposits by households and repayments 
from borrowers on previous loans, as sources of funds for the banks. Banks 
would use these funds for paying back depositors and extending new 
loans, or for banks' consumption. 
Banks are constrained by the amount of assets minus liabilities2: this 
introduces the Capital Requirement Ratio (CRR), according to the Basel 
regulation. 
The fraction of capital (bt-dt) with respect to assets, bt, has to be larger 






 dt≤(1-CRR)bt. (12) 
If we define γ=(1-CRR), where γ≤1, we can say that banks liabilities 
cannot exceed a fraction of its assets, which can be used as collateral: 
 dt≤γbt. (13) 
















where λf,t is the multiplier on the bankers' borrowing constraint. 
2.4 Final Goods Producers 
There is a continuum of identical final goods producers that operate 
under perfect competition and flexible prices. They aggregate intermediate 
goods according to the production function, 









                                                 
2 Deposits represent bank liabilities, while loans represent bank assets. 
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where ε>1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. 
The final good firm chooses Yt(z) to minimize its costs, resulting in de-







The price index is then given by: 







2.5 Intermediate Goods Producers 
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. These 




where α∈[0,1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor. 
















where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost. The price-setting 
problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun set-
ting. In each period an intermediate good producer sells its good at price 
Pt(z) and faces a constant probability, 1-θ∈[0,1], of being able to change the 
sale price. The optimal reset price 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗(𝑧𝑧) solves: 















 is the steady-state markup. 










Market clearing conditions are: 
 Yt=CS,t+CB,t+Cf,t, (24) 
 HS,t+HB,t=1, (25) 
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 Dt=(1-CRR)bt. (26) 
The first equation represents equilibrium in the goods market, and the 
second refers to the total supply of housing, which is fixed and normalized 
to unity. The last equation represents equilibrium in the financial market. 
Finally, according to the Walras law, labor market also clears. 
2.7 Monetary Policy 
















where 0≤ρ≤1 is the interest rate inertia, and φRπ≥0 and φRY≥0 measure the 
response of the interest rate to current inflation and output growth, 
respectively. 
2.8 Macroprudential Policy 
The macroprudential rule shows that the CRR is related to its 
steady-state value and to deviations of credit from its steady state, ac-
cording to the Basel III guidelines. It means that CRR increases when credit 







where φb is the CCyB parameter. 
3 The experiment 
The experiment simulates a permanent partial release of two capital 
buffers: the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) and the Capital Con-
servation Buffer (CCoB). Specifically, in order to model the decrease in 
capital requirements, we assume a release of 0.1% of the CCyB associated 
with a release of 0.5% of CCoB. We remind that CCoB is part of the Capital 
Requirement Ratio (CRR). Thus, the exercise entails a transition from one 
steady-state level of CRR equal to 10.5% as in Basel III regulations, to an-
other steady-state CRR level of 10%. To these different values of CRR, we 
associate different levels of CCyB equal to 2.4% and 2.3%, respectively. 
Busatto, Ferrara, Galano, Varlese: Effects of Releasing Capital Requirements: A DSGE Approach 
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4 Calibration 
We use baseline calibration of structural parameters following Rubio 
and Carrasco-Gallego (2016), consistently with the US data3. The discount 
factor, β, is set to 0.99, 0.98 and 0.965 for savers, borrowers and banks, re-
spectively. The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is 
calibrated at 0.1 to match the steady-state housing wealth-to-GDP ratio, 
which equals 1.40. The parameter η is fixed at 2, in order to calibrate labor 
supply elasticity value to 1. The loan-to-value ratio parameter, κ, is fixed at 
0.9, as in Iacoviello (2015). The labor income share for savers, α, is set to 
0.64, and the price elasticity of demand, ε, is calibrated at 21, so that X is 
equal to 1.05 in steady state, as in Iacoviello (2005).  
In order to simulate a partial release of 0.5% of CCoB, we set the initial 
steady-state value of CRR* equal to 10.5%, consistently with the Basel III 
regulations, and the second steady-state value of CRR** equal to 10%. To 
these values of CRR, we associate two different steady-state levels of CCyB 
equal to 2.4% and 2.3%, respectively. Eventually, γ is defined en-
dogenously and changes according to the CRR steady-state values. The 
responses of interest rate to current inflation and output growth (φRπ, φRY) 
change from the first to the second scenario, as described in the Table A.1 
in the Appendix. Note that the different values of CCyB and of monetary 
policy parameters are estimated by Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016) as 
optimal4. 
5 Results 
In order to assess the different impacts of releasing capital requirements, 
we analyze the long- and short-run macroeconomic effects on real 
economy and, then, we perform a welfare analysis. We numerically solve 
the nonlinear model in DYNARE5 using perfect foresight. All transition 
dynamics are expressed as percentage deviations from the initial 
steady-state level. 
                                                 
3 Table A.1 summarizing parameter values and their description is presented in the 
Appendix. 
4 These parameters are those minimizing second-order losses for households when 
monetary and macroprudential policies act together. The authors used the software 
Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a 
second-order approximation to the constraints. 
5 Dynare is a software platform for handling a wide class of economic models, in 
particular Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. For more details, 
see https://www.dynare.org/; last access September 28, 2021. 
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5.1 Long-run Effects 
Table 1 reports steady-state percentage variations in the key macroeco-
nomic variables. By releasing bank collateral constraint, the reduction in 
capital requirements allows banks to lend more, stimulating loans. This, in 
turn, causes that borrowers benefit of larger liquidity that is used to invest 
in housing rather than to consume more. In other words, they reallocate 
their resources from consumption to housing, enjoying a larger collateral to 
borrow. On the other hand, savers expect that the interest rate on deposits 
returns to the previous steady-state level in the long run. Thus, they decide 
to deposit more. In addition, they invest less in housing given the higher 
price, in order to have more liquidity to spend on future consumption. 
Savers and borrowers' behavior impacts on bank consumption. Indeed, 
the long-run positive variation in deposits, which is larger than the 
long-run positive variation in loans, causes a reduction in bank capital. 
Moreover, the reduction in capital requirements also influences the be-
havior of nominal interest rate on both deposits and loans: while the for-
mer returns to the previous steady-state level, the latter decreases entailing 
lower revenues for banks in the long run. Eventually, dividends reduce. 
Overall, the increase in savers' consumption is not sufficient to com-
pensate the reduction in dividends and borrowers' consumption. The net 
effect is a decrease in aggregate demand, pushing down output. 
 
Table 1. Steady-state Percentage Variations 
Variable Value Variable Value Variable Value 
ΔY∗∗ -0.0151 Δ𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆∗∗ 0 Δ𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵∗∗ -0.0129 
Δ𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆∗∗ 0.0255 Δ𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵∗∗ -0.0033 Δdiv∗∗ -3.9307 
Δ𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆∗∗ -0.2150 Δ𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵∗∗ 0.6172 Δq∗∗ 0.2410 
Δd∗∗ 1.4363 Δb∗∗ 0.8728 ΔCRR∗∗ -4.7619 
Δ𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆∗∗ -0.0203 Δ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵∗∗ -0.0059   
 
5.2 Short-run Effects of Capital Requirements Reduction 
The next step in our analysis is a discussion of short-run effects of capital 
requirements reduction. Figure 1 shows the transition dynamics of both 
real and financial variables from the old to the new steady state. 
Reducing capital requirements immediately impacts on loans that 
increase because banks can lend more. On the other hand, the lower 
interest rate also stimulates loans demand by borrowers. 
As a result, they are incentivized to consume more and demand more 
housing to increase their collateral (Figure 2). Patient and forward-looking 
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households increase their savings because of a higher interest rate on 
deposits. However, they expect that, in the future, their savings will be less 
profitable; therefore, they postpone their consumption when the interest 
rate on deposits will come back to the previous steady-state level. In this 
scenario, also banks are harmed. Indeed, consistently with the long-run 
results, since loans arise less than deposits, bank capital reduces. Thus, 
banks tighten their borrowing constraint. Moreover, interest rate on 
deposits increases, and interest rate on loans reduces. In other words, 
banks have to cope with higher costs, facing lower earnings. This, in turn, 
entails a reduction in dividends, which represent banks' consumption. 
 
Figure 1. Short-run Transition Dynamics for Real and Financial Variables 
 
 
Figure 2. Short-run Transition Dynamics for Real Estate Variables 
 
 
Overall, the capital requirements reduction entails an output expansion 
for only one quarter, caused by an increase in borrowers' consumption that 
compensates for the drop in both savers' consumption and dividends. 
From the next quarter, output starts decreasing due to the fall of borrowers' 
consumption, to reach the long-run steady-state level. 
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Figure 2 focuses on real estate market dynamics. As well as the long run, 
borrowers enjoy the benefit of having more liquidity to demand more 
housing, in order to provide a larger collateral to the banks. The higher 
investment in housing shares by borrowers prevails with respect to the 
lower housing share investment by savers, and this causes an increase in 
housing prices. 
5.3 Welfare Effects of Reducing Capital Requirements 
We now perform a welfare analysis to assess how costly the slackening 
of capital buffers is in terms of welfare. 


















�� ; (30) 
i=s,b,f, 
as the steady-state value of 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 when the macroprudential authority does 
not implement the reduction in capital requirements, and V₀ as the 
steady-state value of 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 when the release of capital requirements is im-
plemented. Since utility function is not cardinal, we need to find a measure 
that can represent welfare costs (or gains) of the CRR reduction. To do that, 
we calculate the welfare-based ratio by using Consumption Equivalent 
Measure (CEM, henceforth) as in Ascari and Ropele (2012), who investigate 
welfare effects of disinflationary policies. 
CEM is defined as the constant fraction of consumption that households 










i , (31) 
 λi=1- exp��1-βi��V0
i -Vold
i �� . (32) 
Then, we compute the Welfare-based Ratio (WRi, henceforth) as the ratio 






* � . 
(33) 
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Releasing CRR is welfare improving when the welfare-based ratio is 
negative, and we read negative values as welfare gains. 
Table 2 reports percentage values of WRs for savers, borrowers, and 
banks. Results show that the reduction in capital requirements has a 
different impact on economic agents. It turns out to be welfare improving 
for savers and borrowers, but not for banks. This is consistent with the 
steady-state variations analyzed in the Section 4.1. 
 





*Values are in percentage terms 
 
Impatient agents benefit from lower capital buffers because they can 
borrow more and invest more in housing shares. The positive variation in 
housing demand in the long run prevails with respect to the negative 
variation in borrowers' consumption, in terms of utility. Moreover, they 
work less, so the labor disutility decreases. This, in turn, causes that the 
reduction in CCyB associated with a reduction in CRR is welfare 
improving for borrowers. On the other hand, patient agents consume more 
and work less in the long run. Thus, savers' utility increases even though 
they invest less in housing shares. Banks welfare strongly worsens because 
of large negative variation in dividends in the long run. 
6 Robustness 
In order to investigate whether a different monetary policy can mitigate 
the negative effects generated by a release in capital requirements, we 
perform the transition experiment of permanent reduction in the CCyB 
associated with a reduction in the CRR under alternative policy regimes 
and, then, we compare results with those described in Section 4 (baseline 
model, henceforth). Therefore, being equal the macroprudential policy, we 
study how the model economy reacts according to three monetary policy 
rules: 
 
1. When central bank responds to inflation and output gap without 
interest rate smoothing (Policy experiment I). 
2. When central bank responds to inflation, output gap, and credit growth 
(Policy experiment II). 
3. When central bank responds to inflation, output gap, and house prices 
(Policy experiment III). 
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Analyzing welfare implications, baseline case results are confirmed 
under each policy experiment6. This means that, even with a different 
monetary policy, lower capital requirements are still welfare improving for 
borrowers and savers, and welfare costly for banks. This is consistent with 
the long-run behavior of variables, that holds both qualitatively and 
quantitatively compared to the baseline model. In the following 
subsections, we show short-term effects on the main economic variables 
implementing the aforementioned three different policy experiments. 
6.1 Policy Experiment I: Central Bank Responds to Inflation 
and Output Gap 
The first regime of monetary policy follows a simple Taylor rule in 
which the central bank adjusts nominal interest rate in response to changes 
in fundamentals. With respect to the baseline model, this rule assumes the 

















Simulating the model, we find out that qualitative results of baseline 
analysis are confirmed in this policy experiment for most of the variables, 
but not for output. Differently from the baseline case in which output ex-
pands for only one quarter, in this regime, output starts falling immedi-
ately: this short-run dynamics is mainly driven by a smaller positive vari-
ation in borrowers' consumption that does not compensate for savers' 
consumption reduction (Figure 3). Hence, the absence of interest rate iner-
tia implicates a lower level of consumption.  
  
                                                 
6  In the sensitivity analyses, we kept all the parameters the same as in our baseline 
experiment. In addition, we performed a robustness check for each of the three 
monetary policy regimes also considering a standard calibration for the Taylor rule. 
Thus, we fixed the response of interest rate to current inflation and output growth 
equal to 1.5 and 0.5, respectively, and we set interest rate inertia parameter equal to 
zero. Results are qualitatively the same as those displayed further: however, with a less 
aggressive monetary policy, the amplitude of short- and long-run effects of the 
reduction in capital requirements is larger. Also welfare analysis results qualitatively 
hold. 
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Figure 3. Short-run Transition Dynamics for Real and Financial Variables 
 
 
In other words, it would be preferable, for the private sector, a monetary 
policy rule that pursues interest rate smoothing objective and that depends 
not only upon current conditions, but also upon past conditions. Indeed, in 
this case, agents will form rational expectations knowing that the 
subsequent policy will be affected by past shocks (Woodford, 2003). In the 
end, central bank should consider a history dependent monetary policy 
rule as in the baseline model because it helps the economy to reach a higher 
level of consumption in the short run, stimulating the aggregate demand. 
6.2 Policy Experiment II: Central Bank Responds to Inflation, 
Output Gap and Credit Growth 
Following Alpanda and Zubairy (2017), we consider an alternative 
policy rule that adjusts the policy rate in response to a measure of financial 
vulnerability in addition to the standard variables. Specifically, we 























where the long-term response coefficient ϕbR is positive for borrowers
7.  
As shown in Figure 4 and as for Policy experiment I, also for this policy 
regime results qualitatively hold in the short run for all variables except for 
output. When the regulator and the monetary authority both act to restrain 
the increase in loans, policy interest rate responds less than when each is 
operating on its own (Christensen and Meh, 2011). 
                                                 
7  The coefficient 𝜙𝜙𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅 is set to 0.1 as in Alpanda and Zubairy (2017). It is positive for 
borrowers since their consumption and housing shares are more correlated with loans. 
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Figure 4. Short-run Transition Dynamics for Real and Financial Variables 
 
 
In other words, adding credit growth response in the Taylor Rule re-
duces the volatility of interest rate, even though the policy rule is more 
aggressive. The reduction in capital requirements immediately impacts on 
loans that increase slightly more, even if the nominal interest rate decreases 
less than in our baseline model. Surprisingly, deposits slightly arise as 
well, despite of their lower interest rate. This happens because savers, who 
are forward-looking agents, expect the stronger reaction from the central 
bank. Therefore, they make decisions according to these expectations. As a 
consequence, savers' consumption decreases. This drop, together with the 
one in dividends, prevails over the increase in borrowers' consumption in 
the short run. This, in turn, reduces immediately the output. In other 
words, along with Kannan et al. (2012), the intimidation of a very severe 
intervention by monetary authority could be more incisive than its actual 
implementation. As a result, in the presence of a macroprudential rule, 
central bank does not have to be aggressive in adjusting the interest rate in 
response to credit. In fact, consistently with Christensen and Meh (2011), a 
"lower output and inflation volatility could be obtained by leaving the bulk 
of the response to credit to the regulatory authority". In other words, we 
can conclude that adding credit growth to the monetary policy rule entails 
a lack of improvement in stability. It follows that a Taylor rule that 
responds only to output gap and inflation - like the one implemented in the 
baseline case - is sufficient to enhance macroeconomic and financial 
stability8. 
                                                 
8 Kannan et al. (2012), quite the opposite, conclude that "the improvement in stability 
from adding nominal credit to the monetary policy rule and employing the 
macroprudential instrument could simply indicate that, under the baseline Taylor rule, 
the reaction to the output gap and inflation is insufficient". 
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6.3 Policy Experiment III: Central bank Responds to Inflation, 
Output Gap and House Prices 
Following Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015), we consider a 
generalized Taylor rule that responds to inflation, output, and house 
prices. Central bank implements a macroprudential policy in which 
interest rate increases whenever house prices raise. In this way, the 
authority restricts credit booms in the economy 9 . In other words, 
considering the case of an extended Taylor rule for monetary policy that 
responds to house prices as well, we will include also financial stability 























Figure 5 shows that results qualitatively hold for all variables, but the 
amplitude of short-run adjustments is smaller with respect to the baseline 
policy rule. 
 
Figure 5. Short-run Transition Dynamics for Real and FInancial Variables 
 
 
This, implies that, in the short term, the expansionary spike of output 
caused by the reduction in capital requirements is slightly mitigated. In 
other words, although long-term effects hold both qualitatively and quan-
titatively, we find that short-term dynamics do not improve compared to 
those of our main results. Considering that and according to Rubio and 
Carrasco-Gallego (2015), we assert that it is preferable to leave the goal of 
financial system stabilization to the macroprudential authority. Therefore, 
a monetary policy should respond only to inflation and output instead of 
being countercyclical vis-a-vis house prices. Furthermore, as for the Policy 
                                                 
9  House prices can be considered as an indicator of excessive credit growth. 
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experiment II, also in this case, considering a monetary policy that is 
macroprudential itself could be redundant if there is already a macropru-
dential regulator. 
7 Conclusions 
The aim of our paper is to examine real and welfare effects of a reduc-
tion in capital requirements, through a permanent reduction in the Coun-
tercyclical Capital Buffer associated with a reduction in Capital Require-
ment Ratio. Our results show that a release in capital buffers reduces 
banks' profits, triggering a deep and prolonged recession. In a context of a 
crisis in which real economy has already been contracted by a negative 
shock, these effects could be amplified and the recession could become 
deeper. In other words, the partial release in capital requirements - like the 
one announced by macroprudential authorities to contrast the pandemic 
outbreak - worsens financial stability, and it does not stimulate aggregate 
demand in terms of consumption. As a result, this macroprudential meas-
ure could generate consequences opposite to those desired. 
As shown in the robustness section, recessionary effects generated by 
the slackening of macroprudential policies occur also with alternative 
monetary policy rules. This is confirmed even with an augmented Taylor 
Rule, which represents a proxy for the macroprudential instrument, taking 
into account financial variables variations. 
Since monetary policy is not able to mitigate recessionary effects gener-
ated by a reduction in capital requirements, it would be interesting to in-
vestigate on the outcomes of an active fiscal policy that uses automatic 
stabilizers. Instead, from the banking regulation point of view, it would be 
interesting to verify if this mechanism of CRR reduction could work with 
an additional constraint, i.e., on deposits. Moreover, it would be useful to 
analyze the effects of softening of borrowers' collateral constraint by in-
creasing the loan-to-value ratio. We leave these extensions for future re-
search. 
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Table A.1. Parameter Values 
Parameter Value Description 
βs 0.99 Discount factor for savers 
βb 0.98 Discount factor for borrowers 
βf 0.965 Discount factors for banks 
j 0.10 Weight of housing 
η 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity 
κ 0.9 Loan-to-value ratio 
α 0.64 Labor income share for savers 
ε 21 Price elasticity of demand 
ρ 0.8 Coefficient for interest rate smoothing 
CRR* 10.5% CRR (old target) 
CRR** 10% CRR (new target) 
       𝜙𝜙𝑏𝑏∗  2.4% CCyB (old target) 
       𝜙𝜙𝑏𝑏∗∗ 2.3% CCyB (new target) 
γ∗ 0.895 (1-CRR*) 
γ∗∗ 0.9 (1-CRR**) 
      𝜙𝜙𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅∗ 48 Inflation stabilization (old target) 
       𝜙𝜙𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅∗∗ 7.4 Inflation stabilization (new target) 
      𝜙𝜙𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅∗ 44 Output stabilization (old target) 
       𝜙𝜙𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅∗∗ 7.8 Output stabilization (new target) 
 
